Without directly naming Defense Secretary Gates' former deputy, Gordon England, Bartlett accused him of 'a total misstatement of fact' in an Aviation Week op-ed piece last year. "It is a total mystery how the former number one advisor to Secretary Gates could write that the F-35 alternate engine was not included in the Pentagon’s plan during or before his tenure when the alternate engine was in the original F-35 acquisition strategy and he signed an agreement with eight other nations to produce the alternate engine."
Bartlett also noted Gates' own statement in August 2009 that "most of the high-risk elements... are largely behind us". Says Bartlett: "Since Secretary Gates made that statement, the F-35 program cost has increased $50 billion, has had two major schedule delays and procurement of 246 F-35 aircraft has been deferred to after 2016. F-35 development completion has slipped from 2014 to 2018, and increased by nearly $10 billion to $56.4 billion, approximately 20 percent."
USAF acquisition chief David van Buren confirms that DoD projections still show the unit procurement cost of the JSF to be 'almost doubled' relative to the original goals. 'This is simply unacceptable and must be reversed.' Van Buren says that there is a 'rigorous should-cost effort' under way for the LRIP.
New program office director VAdm Dave Venlet opens his statement with the frank admission that the program 'has not delivered acceptable results my any measure'. In questions, two key points so far:
- The program has returned old test aircraft to flight after determining that the problem which grounded the aircraft last week is confined to a newer-design generator. The program is still evaluating the impact of the problem on flight operations later this year.
- The F-35B is still on track for sea trials in the fall, Venlet says.
The GAO reports that the total development cost is now $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current baseline and 64 percent above the original estimate. Design changes 'continue at a higher rate than expected, suggesting that the design is not stable several years after critical design review', says GAO director for acquisition and sourcing Michael Sullivan.
Sullivan also notes that DOD has 'not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs, nor approved a new baseline.' since reducing LRIP numbers by 246 aircraft. Update: Sullivan says that the cost of F135 development has increased from $4.8 billion to $8.2 billion, a 70 per cent overrun.
Update 2: Full GAO report now online.
The GAO report is preliminary, with a full report due in April. It notes what we often overlooK; Secretary Gates has not yet approved a new acquisition baseline or a new Milestone B (approval to enter development, the original Milestone B having been rescinded last year after the program's Nunn-McCurdy breach).
The report notes that 'current forecasts indicate that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it replaces. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many aircraft as planned.'
The GAO also hints about 'emerging concerns about... stealth-related issues' - which to those of us who have been through the history of LO, sounds a bit ominous.
The GAO worries about the extent of design changes, which were expected in 2007 to decline rapidly from early 2008 to early 2009 (following CDR) and continue more gradually after that. In all, the program now expects 10000 more changes than planned in 2007.
GAO report"
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